Washington Law Review
Volume 93

Number 2

6-1-2018

Privacy in the Cloud: The Fourth Amendment Fog
Sarah Aitchison

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr
Part of the Fourth Amendment Commons, and the Privacy Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Sarah Aitchison, Comment, Privacy in the Cloud: The Fourth Amendment Fog, 93 Wash. L. Rev. 1019
(2018).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol93/iss2/9

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

Aitchison (Do Not Delete)

6/6/2018 9:41 PM

PRIVACY IN THE CLOUD: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
FOG
Sarah Aitchison*
Abstract: The Cloud has changed how individuals record, store, and aggregate their
personal information. As technology’s capacity for holding an individual’s most intimate
details and recording day-to-day experiences increases, Fourth Amendment privacy
protections become less equipped to respond to technological advances. These advances
allow private companies to store an immense amount of their consumers’ personal
information, and government entities to obtain that information. In response, tech companies
have begun refusing to comply with government demands for information collected and
stored in their devices and in the Cloud, and are increasingly ending up in court, fighting
orders to disclose consumer information. A dynamic tension has developed between the
United States government’s desire and increased capacity to obtain information about
consumers, and tech companies wanting to keep their consumers’ information private. The
relevant statute, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), is not equipped to
address these technological advances. The Supreme Court’s extensive Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence and guidelines for addressing Fourth Amendment issues are similarly ill-suited
to answer the novel and unique issues that accompany digital, remote storage of personal
information. This Comment identifies the inadequacies of ECPA and the Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence as they each apply to technological advances and the potential of Cloud data. It
argues that Congress must revise the legislative scheme to adequately protect information
stored in the Cloud, particularly addressing whether consumers have a right to know when
their information is being accessed by the United States government. Further, it argues courts
lack the tools to adequately amend, reframe, repeal, or apply ECPA, and thus should not be
the primary body making decisions about the bounds of technologically based government
collection under the Fourth Amendment. Alternatively, if the legislature does not act, courts
will remain required to make findings related to whether the collection of information is a
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Courts should, then, recognize that digital data deserves
a fundamentally distinct analysis and discontinue the trend of finding attenuated connections
between classic surveillance techniques and government surveillance using advanced
technology.

INTRODUCTION
In the last five years, Amazon.com, Inc. (Amazon), Apple, Inc.
(Apple), and Microsoft Corporation (Microsoft) have all been subject to
controversies regarding the storage of private digital information via
their Cloud-based data services.1 The Cloud refers to internet-based
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storage systems that, in recent years, have replaced local physical
devices, such as hard drives, as the primary storage system for anything
an individual may view, use, store, or save electronically.2 The fight
between the United States government for Cloud data related to ongoing
criminal investigations and companies that want to protect the privacy of
their consumers has become more contentious and more prevalent.
These companies have been unwilling to turn over their customers’ data
to government agencies attempting to solve crimes or investigate
suspects.3 This resistance from tech companies directly challenges the
government’s broad authority to access this type of data, granted to it
under the 1986 Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA).4
Several recent cases demonstrate the rising tension between
government agencies and tech companies. In 2015, an Arkansas man
hosted a party for his friends where they watched a football game.5 The
next day one of his party guests was found dead in the backyard.6 Police
investigating the crime seized the host’s Amazon Echo device.
Amazon’s Echo constantly records noises in a room and saves any
communications recorded after an individual uses the Echo’s “wake”
word to call it into action. It then sends those communications to
Amazon for storage in the Cloud. Investigators, hoping to find evidence
implicating the host, repeatedly requested Amazon turn over access to

1. Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 233 F. Supp. 3d 887, 887 (W.D. Wash. 2017); Devlin
Barrett, U.S. to Keep Pushing Apple to Unlock iPhone in New York Case, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 8,
2016, 3:38 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-to-keep-pushing-apple-to-unlock-iphone-in-newyork-case-1460128066 [https://perma.cc/7N3P-B5KP] [hereinafter Barrett, U.S. to Keep Pushing
Apple]; Alina Selyukh, As We Leave More Digital Tracks, Amazon Echo Factors In Murder
Investigation, NPR (Dec. 28, 2016, 3:20 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/
12/28/507230487/as-we-leave-more-digital-tracks-amazon-echo-factors-in-murder-investigation
[https://perma.cc/95ZM-BJHD]. The government later dropped the iPhone case. Devlin Barrett,
Federal Prosecutors Drop Court Case to Force Apple to Unlock iPhone, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 22,
2016, 10:36 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/federal-prosecutors-drop-court-case-to-force-appleto-unlock-iphone-1461377642 [https://perma.cc/UM8F-MDK5] [hereinafter Barrett, Federal
Prosecutors Drop Court Case].
2. Joanna Stern, What is the ‘Cloud’?, ABC NEWS (June 26, 2012), http://abcnews.
go.com/Technology/cloud-computing-storage-explained/story?id=16647561
[https://perma.cc/Z7FD-9WKP].
3. Microsoft Corp., 233 F. Supp. 3d at 894; Barrett, U.S. to Keep Pushing Apple, supra note 1;
Barrett, Federal Prosecutors Drop Court Case, supra note 1; Selyukh, supra note 1.
4. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b) (2012).
5. Barrett, U.S. to Keep Pushing Apple, supra note 1; Selyukh, supra note 1.
6. Selyukh, supra note 1.
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the recordings.7 After months of back and forth, Amazon agreed to hand
over the Alexa data at the beginning of March 2017.8
In April 2016, Microsoft filed a complaint against the United States
government alleging the government’s use of ECPA violated the Fourth
Amendment.9 The Western District of Washington dismissed
Microsoft’s Fourth Amendment claim on standing grounds.10 Apple has
also had its own battles with the government regarding customer data.
The Department of Justice tried to force Apple to unlock an iPhone
related to a 2015 San Bernardino, California terrorist attack.11 When
Apple refused to cooperate, the government hired hackers to do the job
for it.12 In another case, the Department of Justice pursued a court order
to force Apple to unlock an iPhone seized in relation to a drug
investigation.13 The government later dropped the case.14 Most recently,
in November 2017, after a gunman attacked a church in Sutherland
Springs, Texas, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) served Apple
with another warrant, this time for both the gunman’s iPhone and Cloud
data.15 Apple has yet to respond to the warrant.16
7. Id.
8. Id. In response, the company released a statement: “Amazon will not release customer
information without a valid and binding legal demand properly served on us. Amazon objects to
overbroad or otherwise inappropriate demands as a matter of course.” Id.
9. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 233 F. Supp. 3d
887 (W.D. Wash. 2016) (No. 2:16-cv-00538-JLR). The complaint also alleges the government’s use
of ECPA is a violation of the First Amendment. Id.
10. Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 233 F. Supp. 3d 887, 887 (W.D. Wash. 2017)
(stating that Microsoft did not have standing to bring this issue as a third party under the Fourth
Amendment, but could bring the claim under the First Amendment).
11. Katie Benner & Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Says It Has Unlocked iPhone Without Apple, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/29/technology/apple-iphone-fbi-justice-depart
ment-case.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/RV62-E8MS].
12. Ellen Nakashima, FBI Paid Professional Hackers One-Time Fee to Crack San Bernardino
iPhone, WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fbipaid-professional-hackers-one-time-fee-to-crack-san-bernardino-iphone/2016/04/12/5397814a-00de
-11e6-9d36-33d198ea26c5_story.html?utm_term=.859eee269aa0 [https://perma.cc/248F-ZN2U].
Before that, in September 2014, Apple made it “impossible for the company to turn over data from
most iPhones or iPads to police—even when they have a search warrant.” Craig Timberg, Apple
Will No Longer Unlock Most iPhones, iPads for Police, Even with Search Warrants, WASH. POST
(Sept. 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/2014/09/17/2612af58-3ed2
-11e4-b03f-de718edeb92f_story.html?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.4e49f7be96f1
[https://perma.cc/RWS4-TEYS].
13. Barrett, U.S. to Keep Pushing Apple, supra note 1.
14. Barrett, Federal Prosecutors Drop Court Case, supra note 1.
15. Rob Thubron, Apple Served with Search Warrant to Access Texas Shooter’s iPhone, iCloud
Account, TECHSPOT (Nov. 19, 2017, 1:47 PM), https://www.techspot.com/news/71947-appleserved-search-warrant-access-texas-shooter-iphone.html [https://perma.cc/X6GX-4CH9].
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These cases all focus on the tension between the appropriate means
through which consumer data can be accessed and who has a right to
that information: whether it belongs to the consumer, the tech companies
storing it, or the United States government. This tension presents
dynamic challenges absent in previous jurisprudence: while courts have
long examined technological capacity and privacy, the immense scope of
data that can now be aggregated and stored in the Cloud is
unprecedented. The impact of these kinds of cases is far-reaching.
Amazon had sold more than eight million Echo devices by January of
2017.17 More than 400 million devices are running Microsoft’s Windows
10.18 Apple’s iPhones are used by more than 700 million people.19 Most
importantly, each of these technological services are Cloud-based, which
means they automatically upload information inputted by consumers into
the Cloud to be stored.20 The sheer amount of private information stored
and then uploaded to the Cloud through these devices is massive.
Courts have attempted to manage the tension between investigative
agencies requiring access to private data and claims that the Fourth
Amendment protects such data. But courts, including the Supreme
Court, lack the tools to adequately engage in the type of technical
analysis required when dealing with private data aggregation by third
parties.21 The existing jurisprudence fails to adequately address when the
government’s examination of information aggregated, disseminated, and
stored on electronic devices and the Cloud is a constitutional violation of
a person’s right to privacy.22 The relevant statute, ECPA, also does not
16. Id.
17. Taylor Soper, More than 8M People Own an Amazon Echo as Customer Awareness Increases
‘Dramatically,’ GEEKWIRE (Jan. 25, 2017, 10:57 AM), https://www.geekwire.com/2017/
8-million-people-amazon-echo-customer-awareness-increases-dramatically/ [https://perma.cc/W2J
H-DQSZ].
18. Tom Warren, Apple Reveals Windows 10 Is Four Times More Popular Than the Mac, VERGE
(Apr. 4, 2017, 9:54 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2017/4/4/15176766/apple-microsoft-windows10-vs-mac-users-figures-stats [https://perma.cc/JRL3-6FN8]. That does not include the number of
people who use Microsoft products that do not use Windows 10. Id.
19. Don Reisinger, Here’s How Many iPhones Are Currently Being Used Worldwide, FORTUNE
(Mar. 6, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/03/06/apple-iphone-use-worldwide/ [https://perma.cc/UU
L8-95QG].
20. Alexa and Alexa Device FAQs, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/
display.html?nodeId=201602230 [https://perma.cc/P43Z-GAB9]; Russell Brandom, Windows 10 Is
the End of Cloud-Free Computing, VERGE (Aug. 17, 2015, 4:59 PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2015/8/17/9167203/windows-10-privacy-scare-cloud-privacy
[https://perma.cc/TJ48-ZUYT]; iCloud for Safekeeping. And Easy Sharing., APPLE,
https://www.apple.com/icloud/ [https://perma.cc/5N3J-PMWJ].
21. Infra section II.A.
22. Id.
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provide adequate guidance.23 The overbroad nature of ECPA and the
lack of judicial clarity on the issue demands congressional action.24
When enacted, ECPA’s authors did not foresee the grand
technological advances used today.25 ECPA was created to deal with
how the government could access the technology of the time,26 which
did not include the immense collection and storage of aggregated data
through the Cloud.27 While much has been written on the reformation of
ECPA as it applies to the individual, there is little about the relationship
between tech companies’ capacity to store private information and the
government’s utilization of the Act to access such information.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has only heard one case regarding the
government’s search power under ECPA and has yet to issue an
opinion.28 Therefore, magistrate, district, and circuit court judges have
been the primary administrators of ECPA. They often come to different
opinions from each other, particularly regarding the protective strength
and scope of court orders that determine in what scenarios the
government can access stored information.29 Congress must enact new
laws or amend ECPA to adequately reflect the massive technological
advances of the past thirty years. In the absence of legislative action,
courts should recognize that digital data and storage is fundamentally
distinct and demands different analysis than the classic tools used to
identify whether a government search is constitutional. Justices have
been reluctant to apply a consistent framework for analyzing searches of
and by technological data—oscillating between recognizing technology
as fundamentally distinct from classic surveillance techniques and
applying the same traditional theories to digital data. The Court should
consistently recognize data as fundamentally distinct and abandon
attempts to bring digital searches in line with traditional surveillance
methods.
Part I of this Comment reviews ECPA, section I.A explores ECPA’s
history, and section I.B discusses courts’ application of ECPA. Part II
23. Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to
Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208 (2004).
24. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b) (2012).
25. Julie J. McMurry, Note, Privacy in the Information Age: The Need for Clarity in the ECPA,
78 WASH. U. L.Q. 597, 602 (2000).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See Carpenter v. United States, __ U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2018) (No. 16-402) (granting
certiorari).
29. Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 233 F. Supp. 3d 887 (W.D. Wash. 2017). See
generally infra section III.A.
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examines the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Section II.A focuses on the established framework for courts to analyze
Fourth Amendment protections afforded to modern data storage and
technology, and section II.B examines three seminal cases, as well as
their concurrences, respectively. These cases indicate that the Court
oscillates between two fundamental principles when dealing with digital
information: first, that digital data searched by advanced technology is
distinct from traditional methods of surveillance; and, alternatively, that
it is simply an extension of traditional methods of surveillances. Part III
analyzes possible solutions to this challenge. Section III.A analyzes
ECPA’s current protections and why it falls flat in the face of modern
technology and aggregated data. Section III.B discusses why the
judiciary is not the correct branch of government to make specific
decisions regarding technology searches. This section further argues that
Congress should amend ECPA or enact new legislation. Finally, section
III.C argues that, if Congress fails to act, the courts should establish that
digital data is fundamentally distinct and is due a new type of analysis
under the Fourth Amendment.
I.

ECPA CREATES AN UNWORKABLE STANDARD AMONG
COURTS

Congress first enacted ECPA in 1986.30 ECPA amended Title 18 of
the U.S. Code, which primarily deals with criminal procedure and
crimes, including when a search or seizure is valid.31 The portion of the
Act related to storing and retrieving digital data is also commonly
referred to the Stored Communications Act (SCA). At the time of
enactment, the primary purpose of ECPA was to “prevent unauthorized
government access to private electronic communications”32 even when
that information was voluntarily provided by an individual to a third
party. ECPA creates a set of procedures the government must abide by
when seeking to obtain private consumer information stored by a third
party, such as Amazon or Microsoft. First, the government can apply for
a court order to access the content of a consumer’s information and
communications so long as the information is “relevant” to an ongoing

30. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
31. Id.
32. What is the Electronic Communications Privacy Act?, MINC: LEGAL RES. CTR.,
https://www.minclaw.com/legal-resource-center/what-is-the-electronic-communications-privacyact/ [https://perma.cc/LKB4-3RK5].
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investigation and has been stored by the company for more than 180
days.33 If the information has been stored by the third party for fewer
than 180 days, the government must obtain a warrant based on probable
cause.34 When the government is authorized to access information from
third-party technology companies—regardless of whether the
government obtains a court order or warrant—it may also prevent those
companies from informing customers that their information is being
searched and monitored by the government.35 Although the government
may only prevent notice to the subject of the search for ninety days at a
time, it may request an extension as many times as it wants. This process
of repeatedly getting court orders to prevent the subjects of searches to
be notified of the search has become known as “secrecy orders” or
“indefinite gags.”36
A.

ECPA Has Not Adapted to Modern Technology

When Congress enacted ECPA in 1986, less than one percent of
Americans had cell phones,37 let alone cell phones that could store
significant amounts of personal information and automatically upload
that information into discreet, electronic storage facilities. Since its
enactment, ECPA has been amended more than ten times,38 but none of
these amendments addressed the standards through which the
government can obtain either content information of private individuals
or an indefinite gag order. As it currently stands, the Act has been
criticized39 for failing to protect consumers in a day and age where
33. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a), (d).
34. Id. § 2703(a).
35. Id.
36. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 9, at 6; Andrew Crocker, New DOJ Policy
on Gag Orders Is Good, but the Courts Could Have Done Better, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 25,
2017), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/10/new-doj-policy-gag-orders-good-courts-could-havedone-better [https://perma.cc/49VY-48KX].
37. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 33, Carpenter v. United States, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016)
(No. 16-402); CTIA, BACKGROUND ON CTIA’S WIRELESS INDUSTRY SURVEY 2 (2015),
https://www.ctia.org/docs/default-source/default-document-library/ctia_survey_ye_2014_graph
ics.pdf [https://perma.cc/YJL9-82JB].
38. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the
Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 871 (2004).
39. In response to ECPA, activist groups have popped up dedicated to the reformation of the Act
in light of the developing technology. Digital4th is one such group. The organization describes its
problem with ECPA in the digital world on its homepage: “[w]hen it passed in 1986, ECPA was
intended to extend Fourth Amendment protections to online communications. However, this was
long before most Americans had access to a home computer, before email was widely used, and
before the invention of Facebook, Twitter, and other social media platforms.” A Summary of the
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sharing information is highly dependent on electronic communications.
Although technology has changed dramatically in the last thirty years,
ECPA has remained “virtually the same.”40 For example, ECPA
provides stronger protections for content information (the body of the
email) rather than non-content information (the subject line of the email)
by creating different standards through which a magistrate may approve
a court order to search the information.41 But, ECPA does not
differentiate between search implications for Cloud-based services and
more traditional web-based services, even though the amount and type
of data stored in each can be drastically different.42 Because the Cloud
provides an expansive online storage system for users, the government
can now quickly and easily access information that would have
traditionally been stored on a local hard-drive or in a desk drawer;
information that would not be automatically shared with a third party.
Therefore, under ECPA the government has broad power to access and
seize information commonly stored online, such as emails or
documents.43 The immense information that can be stored on the Cloud
and the potential to chip away at individuals’ privacy calls for greater
protections than are currently provided.
Before ECPA, federal wiretap and privacy standards only protected
wire and oral communications.44 Through ECPA, Congress sought to
expand protections to cover stored electronic communication, such as
emails, even when they were provided to a third party voluntarily.45
Under ECPA, the government can require a company to turn over vast

Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), DIGITAL4TH, https://digital4th.org/
[https://perma.cc/A5SM-7EPS].
40. Id.
41. The distinction between content data and non-content data is at the crux of Fourth
Amendment search jurisprudence. See generally Riley v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473
(2014); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). The classic example distinguishing the two is a
mailed letter: the information inside the letter is considered content and, therefore, provided greater
Fourth Amendment protections; the information on the outside of the letter, such as the name and
addresses of the correspondents, is considered non-content information. United States v. Forrester,
512 F.3d 500, 511 (9th Cir. 2008) (expanding the logic behind letter information to distinguish
between IP addresses (content) and URLs (non-content)); Electronic Communications Privacy Act,
18 U.S.C. § 2703 et seq. (2012) (establishing the standard for obtaining content information).
42. A Summary of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), supra note 39. This was
also at the crux of Microsoft’s complaint. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 9.
43. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 9, at 1; A Summary of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), supra note 39.
44. Katherine A. Oyama, Note, E-mail Privacy After United States v. Councilman: Legislative
Options for Amendment ECPA, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 499, 504 (2006).
45. Id.
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amounts of information regarding any number of customers46 as well as
prohibit the company from telling customers their data is being shared
with investigators.47 Under the statute, the court issuing the order must
allow the gag order if there is “reason to believe” the notification of a
warrant, subpoena, or court order will result in “(1) endangering the life
or physical safety of an individual; (2) flight from prosecution; (3)
destruction of or tampering with evidence; (4) intimidation of potential
witnesses; or (5) otherwise seriously jeopardizing an investigation or
unduly delaying a trial.”48 Every ninety days, a court may issue a new
gag order as long as one of the criteria is met.49
A recent case involving Microsoft directly addresses the tension
between ECPA as written and indefinite gag orders as applied to Cloud
data. Microsoft alleged section 2705(b), which creates the indefinite gag
order option, is unconstitutional because “[p]eople do not give up their
rights when they move their private information from physical storage to
the cloud.”50 When ECPA was written, Congress did not adequately
consider the type of technology prevalent today and the changes made to

46. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2705 et seq. (2012) (lacking clear
limitations to the governments subpoena power).
47. Id. § 2705(b).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 9, at 2. The complaint also provides an
excellent overview of why the transition from local hardware to Cloud storage implicates the Fourth
Amendment.
Before the digital age, individuals and businesses stored their most sensitive correspondence
and other documents in file cabinets and desk drawers. As computers become prevalent, users
moved their materials to local computers and on-premises servers, which continued to remain
within the user’s physical possession and control. In both eras, the government had to give
notice when it sought private information and communications, except in the rarest of
circumstances.
Cloud computing has spurred another profound change in the storage of private information.
Today, individuals increasingly keep their emails and documents on remove servers owned by
third parties, i.e., in the cloud, using free web-based services . . . . Businesses have also
migrated their information technology infrastructure to servers hosted by providers . . . which
offer productivity software . . . and the ability to access correspondence and other documents
from any device. But the transition to the cloud does not alter the fundamental constitutional
requirement that the government must—with few exceptions—give notice when it searches
and seizes the private information or communications of individuals or businesses.
The government, however, has exploited the transition to cloud computing as a means of
expanding its power to conduct secret investigations. As individuals and business have moved
their most sensitive information to the cloud, the government has increasingly adopted the
tactic of obtaining the private digital documents of cloud customers not from the customers
themselves, but through legal process directed at online cloud providers like Microsoft.
Id.
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the statute throughout the years have failed to address advances in
technology.51
Despite these shortcomings, some jurisdictions have considered the
issue and many have identified that the implication of new technology,
particularly storage of data in the Cloud, warrants stronger protection
than provided under ECPA. At least fifteen states have enacted
legislation aimed at more strongly protecting digital information than the
federal ECPA.52 California, in particular, enacted comprehensive
legislation that requires all law enforcement agencies to obtain a warrant
before accessing content information of consumers, including location
information.53 In contrast, the federal government recently passed a bill
that would allow federal law enforcement agencies to circumvent ECPA
and the Fourth Amendment in accessing consumer data.54 While the
Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data (CLOUD) Act does not
explicitly amend ECPA, it allows foreign governments to access
consumer information from technology companies without a warrant.55
The United States government can then retrieve that data from the
foreign government as it sees fit.56 The tension between tech companies
and the government on the federal and state level indicates that ECPA,
as is, is an inadequate tool for courts analyzing protections under the
Fourth Amendment.57 Additionally, the movement of the states toward
providing stronger protections similarly shows ECPA’s failure to protect
the privacy of individuals.58

51. Id.; Achal Oza, Note, Amend the ECPA: Fourth Amendment Protection Erodes as E-mails
Get Dusty, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1043, 1045 (2008).
52. Kim Zetter, California Now Has the Nation’s Best Digital Privacy Law, WIRED (Oct. 8,
2015, 9:58 PM), https://www.wired.com/2015/10/california-now-nations-best-digital-privacy-law/
[https://perma.cc/Z5TE-PM5H].
53. Id.
54. Tom Krazit, President Trump Signs Omnibus Spending Bill Putting the CLOUD Act on the
Books in Big Shift for Cloud Data, GEEKWIRE (Mar. 23, 2018, 10:50 AM),
https://www.geekwire.com/2018/president-trump-signs-omnibus-spending-bill-putting-cloud-actbooks-big-shift-cloud-data/ [https://perma.cc/3PR5-VWTC].
55. Tom Krazit, As Congress Considers the Tech-Backed CLOUD Act, Privacy and Human
Rights Groups Raise Concerns, GEEKWIRE (Mar. 18, 2018, 12:00 PM), https://www.geekwire.com/
2018/congress-considers-tech-backed-cloud-act-privacy-human-rights-groups-raise-concerns/
[https://perma.cc/MNB3-U7V4].
56. Id.
57. Brief for Petitioner at 21, Carpenter v. United States, __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 293 (2017) (No.
16-402), 2017 WL 3575179, at *21 (“In assessing whether an expectation of privacy is objectively
reasonable, norms and expectation shaped by federal and state statutes are relevant considerations.”
(citing Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 (1989) (plurality opinion))).
58. Zetter, supra note 52.
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Confusion and Inconsistent Outcomes: ECPA’s Section 2705(b)
Delayed Notification Requirement

Wide divergence in the interpretation by lower courts of one of
ECPA’s main provisions for the government’s authorization to collect
information exemplifies the confusing standards and inconsistent
application among lower courts. Many legal scholars have written about
effective ways to amend ECPA.59 Currently, the Supreme Court is
considering a case, Carpenter v. United States,60 examining the validity
of the government’s acquisition of significant amounts of non-content
information based on ECPA section 2703, which sets standards for when
government entities may access information stored by a remote
computing service.61 By enacting section 2703(b), Congress explicitly
intended to prevent the government from engaging in unregulated
“fishing expeditions.”62 Despite scrutiny from academics and the
nation’s highest court, one provision of ECPA has been largely ignored
in the discourse, even though litigation surrounding it has become more
prevalent: section 2705(b)—the indefinite gag order exception. Courts
throughout the country have imposed significantly different outcomes
when it comes to the length of time customers can remain in the dark
about whether their information is being searched.
Courts’ inconsistent application of the indefinite gag order exception
under the Fourth Amendment demonstrates the unworkability of ECPA.
Under ECPA section 2703(a), the government can require companies to
refrain from informing their customers that the government is obtaining
their information when it uses a search warrant.63 But, ECPA

59. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 23 (providing a detailed recommendation for changing ECPA to
adequately address changing technology).
60. __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 293 (2017) (No. 16-402).
61. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Carpenter v. United States, __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct.
293 (2017) (No. 16-402).
62. Brief for Respondent at 31, Carpenter v. United States, __ U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 293 (2017) (No.
16-402), 2017 WL 4311113, at *53 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 827, pt. 1, at 31 (1994)).
63. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2012) (“A governmental entity
may require the disclosure by a provider of electronic communication service of the contents of a
wire or electronic communication, that is in electronic storage in an electronic communications
system for one hundred and eighty days or less, only pursuant to a warrant issued using the
procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the case of a State court,
issued using State warrant procedures) by a court of competent jurisdiction. A governmental entity
may require the disclosure by a provider of electronic communications services of the contents of a
wire or electronic communication that has been in electronic storage in an electronic
communications system for more than one hundred and eighty days by the means available under
subsection (b) of this section.”).
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section 2703(b) does require disclosure to consumers when the
government obtains an administrative court order to access their contentbased information.64 However, section 2705 creates a delayed notice
loophole that allows the government to continue obtaining information
on consumers indefinitely without notifying them, as long as the
government gets a new court order every ninety days.65 These extended
section 2705(b) orders have become known as secrecy, or indefinite, gag
orders. In October of 2017, the Department of Justice imposed the first
limitation on the use of indefinite gag orders by implementing a oneyear limit on the use of indefinite gag orders by federal agents.66
However, the newly implemented policy can be revoked at any time.67
The recent changes to the government policies surrounding the use of
indefinite gag orders do not resolve the larger issue at hand: the
application of indefinite gag orders across jurisdictions results in
different outcomes. The Microsoft case specifically focused on this
issue, claiming that ECPA’s indefinite gag order provision was
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.68 In its complaint,
Microsoft alleged that more than 3,250 secrecy orders were ordered
against the company in fewer than two years.69 The Fourth Amendment
claim was ultimately dismissed on a standing issue, but the case still
sheds light on the concerns over ECPA. The Western District of

64. Id. § 2703(b) (“A governmental entity may require a provider of remote computing service to
disclose the contents of any wire or electronic communication to which this paragraph is made
applicable by paragraph (2) of this subsection—(A) without required notice to the subscriber or
customer, if the governmental entity obtains a warrant issued using the procedures described in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the case of a State court, issued using State warrant
procedures) by a court of competent jurisdiction; or (B) with prior notice from the governmental
entity to the subscriber or customer if the governmental entity—(i) uses an administrative subpoena
authorized by a Federal or State statute or a Federal or State grand jury or trial subpoena; or
(ii) obtains a court order for such disclosure under subsection (d) of this section; except that delayed
notice may be given pursuant to section 2705 of this title.” (emphasis added)).
65. Id. § 2705(a)(4) (“Extensions of the delay of notification provided in section 2703 of up to
ninety days each may be granted by the court upon application, or by certification by a
governmental entity, but only in accordance with subsection (b) of this section.”).
66. Memorandum from Rod J. Rosenstein, Deputy Attorney General, to Heads of Department
Law Enforcement Components; Department Litigating Components; the Director, Executive Office
for U.S. Attorneys; & all United States Attorneys (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.document
cloud.org/documents/4116081-Policy-Regarding-Applications-for-Protective.html
[https://perma.cc/3QWB-AJ2H] [hereinafter DOJ Memo].
67. Crocker, supra note 36.
68. Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 233 F. Supp. 3d 887, 887 (W.D. Wash. 2017); supra
notes 9–10 and accompanying text. Microsoft prevailed on its First Amendment claim when the
Court held the use of indefinite gag orders was a limitation on the company’s speech. Id.
69. Microsoft Corp., 233 F. Supp. 3d at 896.
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Washington Court maintained that Microsoft could not bring this case as
a third party but indicated that ECPA searches were questionable in light
of the Fourth Amendment. The judge opined, “[a]s Microsoft alleges,
the indefinite nondisclosure orders allowed under Section 2705(b) mean
that some customers may never know that the government has obtained
information in which those customers have a reasonable expectation of
privacy.”70 The opinion went on to state that some of Microsoft’s
customers will be unable to vindicate their own Fourth Amendment
rights.71
In contrast to the Microsoft case, federal courts in California have
twice recently determined that a finite period for gag orders is a
commonsense application of ECPA.72 In an order examining the validity
of a warrant issued through ECPA, a magistrate judge held that the
application of indefinite gag orders were unconstitutional in that they
raised First Amendment concerns.73 In that case, the court distinguished
between prior cases where a gag order would expire after ninety days so
long as the government did not request an extension and when the
government asks for a gag order until further notice.74 The court stated
that the requirement of expiration was vital and without it, indefinite gag
orders were unconstitutional.75
In a second recent case, a federal court from the Central District of
California determined that ECPA’s indefinite gag order violated Adobe
Systems Incorporated’s (Adobe) First Amendment rights.76 The court
discussed the lack of controlling precedent for dealing with ECPA’s
indefinite gag orders77 and its inconsistent application across courts,78 a
sentiment echoed in this Comment. The opinion went on to examine the
Microsoft case, as well as other cases from other jurisdictions where an
indefinite gag order was considered constitutional.79

70. Id. at 916.
71. Id. at 915.
72. In re Grand Jury Subpoena for: [Redacted]@yahoo.com, 79 F. Supp. 3d 1091, 1091 (N.D.
Cal. 2015); In re Search Warrant for [Redacted]@hotmail.com, 74 F. Supp. 3d 1184, 1184 (C.D.
Cal. 2014).
73. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 79 F. Supp. 3d at 1091.
74. Id. at 1093.
75. Id.
76. In re Search Warrant, 248 F. Supp. 3d at 970.
77. Id. at 978 (“The Ninth Circuit has not ruled on whether Section 2705(b) allows for indefinite
NPOs, and authority on the question is scarce.”).
78. Id.
79. Id.
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The courts in these cases illustrate the privacy concerns implicated in
the power ECPA provides the government. In In re Grand Jury
Subpoena for: [Redacted]@yahoo.com, 80 the court said,
[W]ere the court to grant the government’s request [for an
indefinite gag order], Yahoo! would be prohibited from ever
sharing the existence of the subpoena with anyone—even years
after the grand jury moved on to other things. In an era of
increasing public demand for transparency about the extent of
government demands for data from providers like Yahoo!, this
cannot stand.81
Courts have largely deferred to Congress when dealing with statutory
protections in the privacy realm, and ECPA is no exception.82 Congress
has left those protections untouched in recent years resulting in different
courts doing different things with practically the same set of facts. With
the increased litigation surrounding ECPA and Cloud data, Congress
should act and create necessary changes to ECPA that can guide courts
as they analyze the government’s ability to access consumer
information.83 One reason why courts have inconsistently applied the
statute is because the relevant jurisprudence is not particularly
instructive.
C.

Courts’ ECPA Jurisprudence Is Inconsistent and Largely
Unhelpful

Other judicial interpretations of ECPA provide little guidance for
dealing with the types of issues relevant in the Microsoft case, and other
government requests for data stored in the Cloud. Most federal court
decisions surrounding ECPA deal with private communications provided
first to a third-party employer, and then to the government. The
relationship between employer and employee creates a situation that is
utterly distinct from one in which the third party has no relationship—

80. 79 F. Supp. 3d 1091 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
81. Id. at 1094–95.
82. Oza, supra note 51, at 1054–55.
Because Congress is in a better position than the courts to conduct fact-finding inquiries,
courts, in deference to Congress, will typically avoid unnecessary determinations of
constitutional questions where Congress has drafted an expansive statutory scheme regulating
some aspect of constitutional rights. The ECPA is one such statutory scheme, and therefore,
courts are often deferential to Congress in determining Fourth Amendment protection for
electronic communications.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
83. Infra section III.A.
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other than as a storage facility for information—with the individual who
is the subject of the search.
There are only three cases where the Supreme Court has explicitly
incorporated ECPA into its analysis. Most recently, in City of Ontario v.
Quon,84 the Court determined that city officials could access a police
officer’s text communications under ECPA.85 The Court’s analysis of
the validity of ECPA rested on distinguishing between the role of the
government as an employer, and the role of the government as a
prosecutor and investigator of crimes.86 Because the Court identified the
government actor as an employer, rather than its more traditional role as
government entity investigating crimes, the Court granted the
government more leeway to access the employee’s information under
ECPA.87 The Court’s analysis renders this case unhelpful when applying
it to the realm of personal information stored in a Cloud and managed by
third parties.
In a case a few years prior, Doe v. Chao,88 Doe claimed the
government violated his right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment
when the Department of Labor used his social security number to verify
his request for benefits under the Black Lung Act.89 Doe raised ECPA as
a last resort to get damages when the Privacy Act he originally sued
under, which regulated the government’s storage of individual’s records,
did not allow for damages.90 Doe attempted to compare the legislative
history of ECPA, which does allow damages, and the Privacy Act to
show that he could receive damages.91 The Court was unconvinced by
his attempts to draw comparisons between the statute at issue and
ECPA.92 The Court said that it was particularly unmoved by a legislative
interpretation that looks beyond the text, history, and relevant case law;
particularly when the records act was enacted after ECPA.93 This
analysis has dissuaded lower courts from using analogous legislation
when identifying legislative purpose.
84. 560 U.S. 746 (2010).
85. Id. at 746–47.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 540 U.S. 614 (2004).
89. Id. at 614.
90. Id. at 626–27.
91. Id. at 626. ECPA’s legislative history indicates a plaintiff could receive minimum damages
without proving real damages, while the Privacy Act at issue in this case does not. Id. at 627.
92. Id. at 626–27.
93. Id.
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The Court’s other ECPA case—the 2001 case Bartnicki v. Vopper94—
does not provide much guidance either.95 In Bartnicki, the Court
considered the validity of government use of information that had been
illegally intercepted and then broadcast to the public.96 However, the
Court focused on whether the radio broadcast of illegally obtained
information was a violation of the First Amendment, and did not
substantially address the Fourth Amendment implications.97 The relevant
analysis of ECPA is inapplicable to the current state of electronic
communication, access, and storage affairs because in Bartnicki, the
issue revolved around a non-governmental person98 accessing
information and what was then done with that information.99 There was
no discussion of the role of governmental officials, who may have been
able to legally obtain the information under ECPA, if they had properly
requested it.100 The government did not intercept the information at all,
making the case wholly irrelevant to this Comment’s analysis.101 There
was also no discussion of the initial acquisition of the information—the
Court focused on what that electronically stored information was used
for later.102 Therefore, none of the Court’s ECPA cases are illustrative
for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis and third parties who are
not employers.
While the Supreme Court has yet to examine the validity of ECPA,103
several of the circuit courts have. Most are employment cases that are
irrelevant to the unique consumer-business relationships at issue in this
Comment. United States v. Councilman,104 Garcia v. City of Laredo,105

94. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 514. During contract negotiations between a union and their employer, part of a
conversation was recorded and then played on the radio the next day. The union contended the
recording was obtained in violation of the Wiretap Act, which is related to ECPA, and therefore, it
was illegal to play it on the radio. Id.
97. Id.
98. It was unknown who intercepted the communication and leaked it to the radio reporter (or
whether the radio reporter was the one who accessed the communication in the first place). Id. at
514–15.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Pending the Court’s forthcoming opinion in Carpenter v. United States, __ U.S. __, 137 S.
Ct. 2211 (2018) (No. 16-402).
104. 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005).
105. 702 F.3d 788 (5th Cir. 2012).
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Theofel v. Farey-Jones,106 and United States v. Warshak107 are all
seminal cases examining ECPA outside the employment context.
However, the courts decided Councilman and Theofel prior to 2008,
before Cloud computing technology was widespread.108 In Councilman,
the First Circuit held that an Internet Service Provider (ISP) could
conduct real-time surveillance of its customers’ email exchanges when
the communication was intercepted while transferring between storage
locations.109 The Fifth Circuit in Garcia determined that ECPA did not
apply to information stored on a personal cell phone.110
In Theofel, the Ninth Circuit focused on ECPA’s cause of action.111
Although the case directly addressed the relevant issues and tension
between government acquisition of information and third-party storage,
it did not create enduring precedent. In Theofel, the government obtained
“‘[a]ll copies of e-mails sent or received by anyone’ at [the company],
with no limitation as to time or scope” after being granted an overbroad
warrant.112 The court made a broad ruling that created different warrant
requirements for unopened emails and unopened emails that had
“expired in the normal course.”113 Since the Theofel decision, lower
courts in the Ninth Circuit have struggled to understand the distinction
between unopened emails and unopened emails that are expired.114 Other
circuit courts have explicitly rejected that analysis as overbroad and
unworkable.115
Most notably, in United States v. Warshak, the Sixth Circuit explicitly
recognized that an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the content of their email messages held by their third-party ISP.116 The
court held that a government agency could not compel email messages
from a third party without a warrant.117 Warshak was brought to court
106. 359 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2004).
107. 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010).
108. For example, Apple did not launch its customer cloud until 2011. Ross Rubin, Switched On:
Apple’s Cloud Conundrum, ENGADGET (June 12, 2011), https://www.engadget.com/2011/06/12/
switched-on-apples-cloud-conundrum/ [https://perma.cc/FC83-R627].
109. Councilman, 418 F.3d at 67.
110. Garcia, 702 F.3d at 790 (declining to extend the determinations made by the First Circuit in
United States v. Councilman).
111. Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1072 (referring to ECPA by its other name, the SCA).
112. Id. at 1071.
113. Id. at 1076.
114. Kerr, supra note 23, at 1214.
115. United States v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769, 772 (C.D. Ill. 2009).
116. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 274 (6th Cir. 2010).
117. Id. at 286.
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for conning people into purchasing herbal supplements, which
promised—but failed to—significantly increase penis size.118 During its
investigation, law enforcement officers seized about 27,000 of
Warshak’s private emails from his ISP after obtaining a court order, but
not a warrant, under ECPA.119 The Sixth Circuit held that even though
ECPA technically allowed for the acquisition of tens of thousands of
emails with a court order, it was still a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.120 In its analysis, the court recognized that digital data is
fundamentally distinct from traditional means of communication and
information storage: “[i]n short, ‘account’ is an apt word for the
conglomeration of stored messages that comprises an email account, as
it provides an account of its owner’s life. By obtaining access to
someone’s email, government agents gain the ability to peer deeply into
his activities.”121 The court ultimately determined that, because of the
government agents’ good-faith belief that they did not need a warrant to
access the content of Warshak’s emails held by his ISP, the emails
would not be excluded from the trial even though they were improperly
gathered under ECPA.122 However, the court’s departure from the
standard application of ECPA and the recognition of the strain between
the statute and the Fourth Amendment makes the case particularly
noteworthy, even when the court ultimately allowed the emails.
Together, these four cases showcase the variance in court decisions
when interpreting ECPA and the inconsistency across jurisdictions.
Other circuits have also taken up the issue, but never when the
government was trying to access information about individuals, making
the analysis distinct from cases where ECPA is used to obtain
information in the Cloud.123 In Fraser v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance
Co.,124 the Third Circuit held that a company’s interception of an
employee’s email account to prove his disloyalty and consequently fire
him was not a violation of ECPA.125 In Hall v. Earthlink Network,

118. Id. at 277.
119. Id. at 283.
120. Id. at 274.
121. Id. at 284.
122. Id. at 274.
123. See, e.g., Expert Bus. Sys., LLC v. BI4CE, Inc., No. 06-1265, 2007 WL 1381595, at *2 (4th
Cir. May 9, 2007) (holding that ECPA was not violated when someone forwarded the emails to a
third party because there was no government interception).
124. 352 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 2003).
125. Id. at 109–11.
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Inc.,126 the Second Circuit summarily dismissed a case in favor of the
ISP in which a plaintiff claimed the ISP intercepted his email and
identified him as a spammer.127 Because these cases deal primarily with
the employee-employer relationship or relationships solely between
private individuals, they fail to provide meaningful ECPA analysis for
courts to apply when examining searches of Cloud data.
Guest v. Leis128 is more illustrative of how the government acquires
private information under ECPA. While most of the circuit court
opinions regarding ECPA fail to address the relationship between private
information and government seizure, in Leis, the Sixth Circuit held that
information meant for public posting was not subject to a reasonable
expectation of privacy.129 Specifically, an online bulletin board system
was seized as part of an obscenity investigation.130 Users of the bulletin
board brought a claim against investigators under ECPA, alleging that
the investigation into the posts was a violation of a citizen’s reasonable
expectation of privacy.131 The court determined that, because the users
were planning to post their information to the public, they were not
afforded protection under the Fourth Amendment.132 Leis is particularly
relevant to the issues at hand because of the court’s explicit Fourth
Amendment analysis and the government actors’ seizure of the
information of private officials.133 However, the case is distinguishable
from ECPA Cloud cases because the information the government
officials seized was explicitly for public use, whereas the cases relating
to tech companies, such as Microsoft, involve the search and seizure of
information that is not explicitly intended for public posting.134 The
circuit court cases illustrate the many kinds of ECPA analyses courts can
engage in and establish that whether the party seeking the information is
a private person or a government actor is a threshold question for ECPA
analysis.135

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

396 F.3d 500 (2d Cir. 2005).
Id. at 508.
255 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 326.
Id. at 330.
Id.
Id. at 333.
Id. at 334.
Id. at 333.
Supra section I.B.
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THE SUPREME COURT’S FOURTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE FAILS TO ADDRESS THE FULL GAMUT
OF TECHNOLOGICAL PRIVACY ISSUES

To understand the relationship between the Fourth Amendment and
the Cloud, it is vital to understand the rights afforded to individuals
under the Fourth Amendment and the breadth of power the government
has in accessing private information from tech companies under ECPA.
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.”136 The Supreme Court has parsed this language
into multiple tests. First, the government is conducting a “search” if they
are seeking information that can only be found by penetrating an
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.137 Second, warrantless
searches are per se unreasonable absent a few specific exceptions.138
Third, to analyze constitutional searches, courts have consistently
examined the methods through which information was acquired, not
necessarily the subject matter of the information.139 Finally, courts apply
different analyses when examining whether an individual’s property has
been seized under the Fourth Amendment.140
To understand how the Fourth Amendment interacts with ECPA and
the subsequent impact on obtaining digital data, it is important to
understand the Court’s extensive Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
ECPA was meant to create clear digital protections under the Fourth
Amendment when dealing with digital data141 and was guided by
foundational Fourth Amendment principles: examining how, not what,
data is collected by the government, and whether an individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in that data.142 In conducting this
analysis, the Court has echoed ECPA’s creators in its desire to avoid
“dragnet-type law enforcement practices.”143
136. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
137. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). While the
reasonable expectation of privacy test came originally from Justice Harlan’s concurrence, it quickly
became controlling law. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11 (2013).
138. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (the defendant in Katz took and placed illegal bets over the phone
while investigators listened in. Justice Harlan suggested the defendant had a reasonable expectation
of privacy within the phone booth).
139. Id. at 361–62.
140. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 400–01 (2012).
141. Kerr, supra note 23, at 1209–19.
142. Id.
143. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983); see also supra section I.A.
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A. Early Cases in Modern Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence Created
Vital Doctrines for ECPA Analysis
Beginning in the 1960s, the Supreme Court revamped its Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, introducing new ideas and doctrines that
have become integral to Fourth Amendment analysis in both the
traditional and technological realm. In his concurrence to the 1967
decision in Katz v. United States,144 Justice Harlan created the
reasonable expectation of privacy test.145 This standard examines
whether an individual has an intent to manifest information as private,
and whether society deems that expectation of privacy reasonable.146 For
example, society finds it much more reasonable that a person manifest
an intent for privacy in a conversation within their home compared to on
a public street. In Katz, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places, from unreasonable search and seizure.147
Therefore, for the government to obtain information on an individual
without obtaining a search warrant, the government must do so in a way
that does not violate an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.148
In United States v. Miller,149 the Supreme Court developed a second
key factor in Fourth Amendment doctrine: the third party doctrine.150
The third party doctrine mandates that once a person voluntarily
provides information to a third party, that person no longer has a
reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the content of that
information.151 Importantly, ECPA has been described as “a

144. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
145. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 351 (majority opinion).
148. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
149. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
150. Id. at 443. The defendant was convicted of multiple federal offenses and argued that checks
and other documents he had sent to banks were improperly admitted as evidence against him
because he had an expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment. Id. The Court said the
action was not improper under the Fourth Amendment’s third party doctrine. Id. By providing the
checks and documents to banks, he no longer had a reasonable expectation of privacy in those
documents. Id.
151. Id.; see also United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 745 (1971) (concealed radio transmitter
on an informant was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S.
293, 294 (1966) (using an individual’s statements he made with a government informer, even in
private, did not violate the Fourth Amendment); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 427–30
(1963) (federal agent entering the defendant’s office with consent while carrying a recording device
was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment).
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Congressional attempt at applying third party doctrine to electronic
communications in storage with third parties.”152
Additionally, the Supreme Court has established important
limitations, such as requiring warrants, or the use of court orders to
authorize searches, including those issued under section 2703(b) and
extended under section 2705(b).153 These warrant limitations are meant
to ensure that magistrate judges act as more than just a rubber stamp and
limit the ability of police to conduct ad hoc and questionable searches.
Under the Fourth Amendment, a subpoena or warrant for government
officials to conduct a search must be “sufficiently limited in scope,
relevant in purpose, and specific in directive so that compliance will not
be unreasonably burdensome.”154 This court order requirement is also
echoed in the language and application of ECPA.155
B.

The Supreme Court Gives New Technology Varied Considerations
Under the Fourth Amendment

Two seminal cases, United States v. Karo156 and United States v.
Knotts,157 first established the traditional analysis for technology and the
Fourth Amendment. Both cases dealt with whether the police could,
without a warrant, attach a beeper to track the location of cans of
chloroform158 and ether,159 respectively. In both cases, the Court drew a
clear line regarding the application of Fourth Amendment principles to
new technology: if visual surveillance would have provided the same
information as high-tech surveillance, the new technology was not
subject to new or different Fourth Amendment analysis.160 Although the
cans were each tracked for multiple days, in Knotts the Supreme Court
found no search implicating the Fourth Amendment because the can was
only tracked in public locations where there was no reasonable
expectation of privacy, and where the police, hypothetically, could have

152. Oza, supra note 51, at 1054; see also infra section II.A.
153. Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 464 U.S. 408, 415 (1984).
154. Id. (citing See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967)).
155. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2012). However, under ECPA,
law enforcement agents may also receive a non-warrant court order to access third-party consumer
information. Id.
156. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
157. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
158. Id. at 277.
159. Karo, 468 U.S. at 708.
160. Id. at 721; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282.
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tracked the individual with the naked eye.161 In contrast, in Karo, the
Court found there was a search.162 In that case, the beeper tracked the
can—and, therefore, the individual—to specific rooms inside a home.163
Because the police would not have been able to gather that information
through traditional surveillance methods, the court found the collection
of that information violated an individual’s reasonable expectation of
privacy.164
Since Karo and Knotts, the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence has expanded and modernized. Not only has the Court
increasingly considered technological advances, but it has also
considered the amount of information that modern devices have the
capacity to collect—a clear departure from the analysis used in Knotts
and Karo. In 2001, the Court first acknowledged the important
relationship between technological advances and privacy protections.165
In Kyllo v. United States,166 the Court held a police department violated
the Fourth Amendment when it used heat-sensing technology to see the
contents of a home.167 The Court reasoned that when the government
used technology that significantly enhanced the ability of police to
search a home without notice to the individuals inside, it violated the
reasonable expectation of privacy test.168 The type of technology and
specific issues in Kyllo are distinct from the constitutional implications
of Cloud-based storage. However, the case is instructive in its
consideration of advancing technology in the realm of the Fourth
Amendment because the Court gave deference to the power of
technology: “[t]he question we confront today is what limits there are
upon this power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed
privacy.”169 Furthermore, in Kyllo, the dissent discussed the importance
of assuring individuals that advanced technology would not erode the
Fourth Amendment protections first considered by the Founders.170
161. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282.
162. Karo, 468 U.S. at 714–16.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2001).
166. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
167. Id. at 34.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 28.
170. Id. at 46 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405 (2012)
(stating that the expansion of Fourth Amendment protections through the reasonable expectation of
privacy test was unnecessary because the fundamental protection against governmental trespass had
been violated).
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The decision from Kyllo directs lower courts to engage in a
technological analysis when considering Fourth Amendment
protections.171 During oral argument, Justice Stevens acknowledged the
Court was hesitant to create precedent that would anticipate issues with
future technological advances.172 Additionally, in the opinion, majoritywriter Justice Scalia recognized the inadequacy of using history to
analogize to the modern use of technology when he held, “[i]t would be
foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the
Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of
technology.”173
United States v. Jones174 and Riley v. California175 are two important,
modern cases for analysis of ECPA. In both cases, the Justices were
divided on how to reconcile technological advances and traditional
Fourth Amendment doctrines.176 The collection of aggregate information
was a major issue in both cases.177 Noted Fourth Amendment legal
scholar Orin Kerr has dubbed this type of data collection Mosaic
Theory.178 Mosaic Theory is the idea that modern data collection
involves the use of a significant number of data points to paint a detailed

171. Kyllo, 468 U.S. at 46.
172. Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (No. 99-508),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2000/99-8508.pdf
[https://perma.cc/THA4-9CV8]. When the appellant’s lawyer suggested the Court should rule on
what technology is capable of, Chief Justice Rehnquist responded, “I don’t think you’re correct in
that. I think in a Fourth Amendment case we decide what was actually done, not what something is
capable of.” Id.
173. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33–34.
174. 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (the government suspected a man of running a drug ring and attached a
GPS tracking device to the bottom of his wife’s car, after its warrant authorization had expired, for
four weeks to track him).
175. __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
176. In Jones the Court unanimously held that the Fourth Amendment was violated. However,
Justice Sotomayor and Justice Alito each wrote a concurrence hinging on the reasonable expectation
of privacy test; Justice Alito’s concurrence was joined by three other justices. Jones, 565 U.S. at
400 (majority opinion); id. at 413 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 418 (Alito, J., concurring). In
Riley, the Court unanimously determined that the search of an individual’s cell phone contents
incident to arrest was an unconstitutional search. Riley, 134 S. Ct., at 2484–85.
177. Jones, 565 U.S. at 429 (Alito, J., concurring); Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489–91. Furthermore, in
November 2017, during the oral argument in Carpenter v. United States, many of the questions
posed by the Court seemed to reflect continued skepticism of immense data aggregation. For
example, Justice Sotomayor went as far as to ask the government’s attorney, “[h]ow would – would
you like to lose?” Supra note 61, at 66.
178. Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 311
(2012).
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picture of an individual’s life that would otherwise be protected in the
traditional application and spirit of the Fourth Amendment.179
Riley consolidated two cases in which officers searched the cell
phones of suspects without warrants and found information that
ultimately led to each suspect being charged with serious crimes.180 The
Supreme Court held the warrantless search of cell phones was
unconstitutional even under the relevant exceptions, such as search
incident to arrest.181 Departing from traditional Fourth Amendment
application, the opinion relied heavily on the technological advances and
immense data aggregated in cell phones.182 The Court held, “[b]efore
cell phones, a search of a person was limited by physical realities and
generally constituted only a narrow intrusion on privacy. But cell phones
can store millions of pages of text, thousands of pictures, or hundreds of
videos. This has several interrelated privacy consequences.”183 The
Court recognized that cell phones today are vastly different from other
effects, those that would have been constitutional to search incident to
arrest in earlier days (e.g., a pocket book someone was carrying at the
time of arrest).184 This is particularly true when the ability of cell phones
to upload information into remote storage facilities makes them
fundamentally different from traditional personal storage devices.185
Two years before Riley, the Supreme Court rejected the opportunity
to explicitly analyze the government’s collection of aggregate
information using unprecedented technological advances in United
States v. Jones. Jones dealt with a government actor who followed a
suspect by attaching a device to the suspect’s car and analyzing the
Global Positioning System (GPS) data.186 The Court’s analysis hinged
on an entirely distinct type of Fourth Amendment analysis separate from
the reasonable expectation of privacy standard.187 The majority did not
engage in any reasonable expectation of privacy analysis, and instead
determined the government acted unlawfully because attaching the GPS
to the car was considered a trespassory search of property under the
179. Id. at 313.
180. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480–82.
181. Id. at 2493. However, other warrant excepts may still apply. Id. at 2494.
182. Id. at 2489–91.
183. Id. at 2478.
184. Id. at 2490.
185. Id. at 2491.
186. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 403 (2012).
187. See id. at 406–08 (relying on the Fourth Amendment trespass analysis, rather than
reasonable expectation of privacy analysis).
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Fourth Amendment.188 In the majority opinion, Justice Scalia implied
that when drafting the Fourth Amendment, the Founders had the
capacity to address future scenarios that are based on rapid technological
advancement.189 This assertion directly contradicts Scalia’s position in
Kyllo.190 The Court recognized that without the physical seizure, the
reasonable expectation of privacy test would not have protected Jones,
because it would have been acceptable for a police car to physically
follow him around.191 In rejecting the necessity of the reasonable
expectation of privacy analysis, Justice Scalia did not consider advanced
technology and instead compared the ability of a GPS device and data
storage to that of an old-fashioned stakeout.192 He refused to identify that
the physical collection of data, traditionally done with the naked eye,
and the electronic collection of aggregate data, using advanced
technology, have different implications under the Fourth Amendment.193
The majority opined,
There is no precedent for the proposition that whether a search
has occurred depends on the nature of the crime being
investigated. And even accepting that novelty, it remains
unexplained why a 4-week investigation is “surely” too long and
why a drug-trafficking conspiracy involving substantial amounts
of cash and narcotics is not an “extraordinary offens[e]” which
may permit longer observation . . . . We may have to grapple
with these “vexing problems” in some future case where a
classic trespassory search is not involved and resort must be had

188. Id. at 404–05.
189. See id. at 410–11 (“What we apply is an 18th-century guarantee against unreasonable
searches, which we believe must provide at a minimum the degree of protection it afforded when it
was adopted.” (emphasis in original)).
190. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
191. Jones, 565 U.S. at 412.
192. Id. at 411–12. Of this analysis and the concurrences’ disdain of it, Scalia wrote:
The concurrence faults our approach for “present[ing] particularly vexing problems” in cases
that do not involve physical contact, such as those that involve the transmission of electronic
signals. We entirely fail to understand that point . . . even assuming, that the concurrence is
correct to say that ‘traditional surveillance’ of Jones for a 4-week period “would have required
a large team of agents, multiple vehicles, and perhaps aerial assistance,” our cases suggest that
such visual observation is constitutionally permissible. It may be that achieving the same result
through electronic means, without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of
privacy, but the present case does not require us to answer that question.
Id. (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).
193. Id.; cf. id. at 427 (Alito, J., concurring) (discussing the importance of recognizing
technological advances in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
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to Katz analysis; but there is no reason for rushing forward to
resolve them here.194
These seminal cases show the Supreme Court’s inconsistency when
considering the implications of the Fourth Amendment on new
technology. The Court oscillates between acknowledging that the ease,
convenience, and discreteness of collecting an aggregate amount of data,
such as that in the Cloud, requires a different kind of analysis, and
attempting to square traditional doctrines with new surveillance
techniques.
C.

The Jones Concurrences Show Skepticism When Applying the
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Standard and Third Party
Doctrine Standard to Modern Technology

Although the Jones majority did not engage in a reasonable
expectation of privacy analysis, both concurrences did and their
reasoning shows a Court without a clear of idea of where to go next. In
Jones, the two concurrences written by Justice Alito and Justice
Sotomayor applied a reasonable expectation of privacy analysis and
third party doctrine analysis to the attachment of the GPS device.195
Furthermore, both Justices Alito and Sotomayor expressed concern over
whether the Fourth Amendment doctrines provided adequate protection
of digital data.196 Both concurrences determined that collecting large
amounts of information by attaching a GPS device to a person’s car was
an unconstitutional search.197 Further, they determined it may have been
a violation of an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy, even
when the car was in a public place where an individual would not
traditionally have a reasonable expectation of privacy.198
Justice Alito’s concurrence, joined by three members of the Court,
stated that the warrantless aggregate collection of data was
unconstitutional.199 But he did not explicitly address the boundaries of
194. Id. at 412–13.
195. Id. at 419 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
196. Id. at 420 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
197. Id. at 420 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
198. Id. at 420 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); cf. United States v.
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983) (finding that an individual did not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy when traveling on public roads).
199. Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring). In considering technological advances and the
reasonable expectation of privacy, Justice Alito said it “rests on the assumption that this
hypothetical reasonable person has a well-developed and stable set of privacy expectations. But
technology can change those expectations. Dramatic technological change may lead to periods in
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collecting aggregate information. Rather, he determined that because the
issue in Jones was clearly past that line, it was unnecessary to create
those boundaries.200 Justice Alito argued, “[w]e need not identify with
precision the point at which the tracking of this vehicle became a search,
for the line was surely crossed before the 4-week mark.”201 Justice
Alito’s analysis indicates that the constitutionality of the issue directly
depends on the length of time of the surveillance.202 His skepticism
applying established doctrines to new technological capacities is echoed
in his request that the legislature act. In his Jones concurrence, Justice
Alito tipped his hat at the legislature’s quick enactment of federal
wiretap laps after the Katz decision established the reasonable
expectation of privacy test: “Congress promptly enacted a
comprehensive statute . . . and, since that time, the regulation of
wiretapping has been governed primarily by statute and not by case
law.”203 Justice Alito asked for a similar legislative response postJones.204
Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence also briefly addressed the related
privacy issues:
I for one doubt that people would accept without complaint the
warrantless disclosure to the government of a list of every Web
site they had visited in the last week, or month, or year. . . . I
would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to
some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that
reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.205
Justice Sotomayor’s opinion does not align with the third party
doctrine as explained in United States v. Miller, where the Court held
voluntary disclosure to a third party removes an individual’s reasonable
expectation of privacy.206 Instead, her concurrence indicates the third
party doctrine is not conducive to analyzing an individual’s reasonable
expectation of privacy in a modern age where a third party, such as an
ISP, has collected and stored aggregate amounts of information.207 The
which popular expectations are in flux and may ultimately produce significant changes in popular
attitude.” Id. at 427.
200. Id. at 430.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 430–31.
203. Id. at 427–28.
204. Id. at 429.
205. Id. at 418 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
206. Id. at 417–18.
207. Id. at 417.
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Jones concurrences show that the Court’s application of traditional
Fourth Amendment doctrines has logical limitations even without
explicit, controlling action by the Supreme Court.
III. ANALYZING THE FAILURES OF ECPA AND A POSSIBLE
SOLUTION FOR COURTS
Neither Fourth Amendment jurisprudence nor ECPA is equipped to
regulate the constitutionality of government searches in a time when so
much personal data is held in the Cloud.208 Modern technology,
particularly the Cloud, requires a new analysis because the way
technology is used today is vastly different than how it’s been used in
earlier times. For example, while analogies may be drawn between the
government’s ability to intercept a letter and the government’s ability to
intercept an email, the comparison to letters fails to acknowledge the
increasing ease with which parties can identify and locate specific pieces
of data about specific individuals in the Cloud.209 Tech companies
continue to have increased capacity to store, aggregate, and locate
specific consumer data.210 As one commentator noted,
What does all this mean in terms of the Fourth Amendment? It’s
simple: the technological and human factors that constrained the
gathering and processing of data in the past are fast
disappearing. Prior to these “advances,” even the most illintentioned government urges to intrude on and do away with
the privacy of citizens were held in check by the possible. The
techno-gloves are now off and the possible is increasingly
whatever an official or bureaucrat wants to do. That means
violations of the Fourth Amendment are held in check only by
the goodwill of the government, which might have qualified as
the ultimate nightmare of those who wrote the Constitution.211
A.

ECPA in Its Current Form Is Not the Answer

Although the original intent of ECPA—and of subsequent
amendments to ECPA—was to bring privacy law into the digital age, it
has largely failed to address the implications of technological advances
208. Peter Van Buren, 4 Ways the Fourth Amendment Won’t Protect You Anymore,
MOTHERJONES (June 26, 2014, 9:44 PM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/06/howfourth-amendment-not-protect [https://perma.cc/734J-P2NA].
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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and privacy protections in a way that provides adequate guidance for
courts.212 ECPA’s language reflects the type of technology that was
available in the 1980s when it was first enacted.213 The massive leaps in
technology between the 1980s and now goes without saying. Even at
that time, ECPA was playing catch-up, trying to update the previous act
to keep the relationship between law enforcement and private citizens
modern in light of advancing technology.214 ECPA is not only illequipped to address technological changes since its enactment, it is also
incapable of addressing technological changes that are still to come.215
Technological inadequacies aside, the law also fails in other ways.
Although ECPA was written to deal with electronic searches, it provides
less protection than similar statutes that deal with physical searches.216
While section 2705(b), guiding the use of indefinite gag orders, is just
one provision of ECPA, it is vital because it regulates the fundamental
warrant, consumer notification, and access requirements.217 Microsoft’s
2016 complaint challenging the government’s use of ECPA’s indefinite
gag orders strongly highlights this dynamic when it identifies that ECPA
section 2705(b) is different from physical search regulation statutes
because the analogous physical search statute requires a notification of
search within thirty days without indefinite gag orders.218 Therefore, the

212. McMurry, supra note 25, at 598–99.
While the ECPA represented significant progress for privacy general when it was passed in
1986, technology has continued to outpace the law. The ECPA was required to update the 1968
Act in order to preserve privacy rights in light of advances in technology. Similarly, the ECPA
has been made less relevant and less effective due to subsequent advances in technology which
have occurred even more rapidly [than] between the passage of the 1968 Act and the ECPA.
Laws concerning privacy must be clear, easily applicable, and up-to-date so as to safeguard
this valuable right. Because the ECPA has proven itself to be unclear and confusing, especially
in light of advances in technology, it needs to be amended to promote privacy in an
increasingly technological world.
Id. ECPA has been amended since this article was published but arguably not to the extent
necessary to make McMurry’s statement out-of-date.
213. Oza, supra note 51, at 1045.
214. McMurry, supra note 25, at 614.
215. Alyson Shontell, The Next 20 Years Are Going to Make the Last 20 Look Like We
Accomplished Nothing in Tech, BUS. INSIDER (June 16, 2014, 2:54 PM), http://www.businessin
sider.com/the-future-of-technology-will-pale-the-previous-20-years-2014-6 [https://perma.cc/E3JVFBNS] (“[T]he next 20 years are going to make this last 20 years just pale . . . .
We’re just at the beginning of the beginning of all these kind of changes. There’s a sense that all the
big things have happened, but relatively speaking, nothing big has happened yet.” (citing Kevin
Kelly, founder of Wired)).
216. Grounds for Issuing Search Warrants, 18 U.S.C. § 3103 (2012).
217. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b).
218. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 9, at 8–9, 11. The statute that deals with
physical searches requires a person whose documents are being searched to be notified within thirty
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law provides government investigators with significantly more leeway
(an extra two months of search time with significantly better search
techniques) when searching an individual’s digital rather than physical
storage.
The recent changes to the laws affecting access to consumer data are a
mixed bag. Taking the lead from the Department of Justice’s new
policy,219 implementing limitations for indefinite gag orders as a
statutory scheme is a good first step to cure ECPA’s failures. Particularly
through the indefinite gag order loophole, the Act provides fewer
protections for consumers.220 However, the introduction of the CLOUD
Act221 undermines ECPA and the newly implemented DOJ Policy. The
CLOUD Act is ultimately a move backward. The recent and directly
conflicting proposals for ECPA guidance from the federal government
demonstrate how strongly comprehensive data protection reform is
needed.
Compounding ECPA’s shortcomings is the fact that technology
typically evolves exponentially.222 Using ECPA as a privacy protection
in 2018 is akin to using a fax machine to send an email. Congress’s lack
of affirmative action enables lower courts to enact significantly different
standards, particularly related to indefinite gag orders. This leaves the
fundamental element of Fourth Amendment law—how data is
collected—inadequately addressed. Congress’s failure to enact
comprehensive reform has left the door open for patchwork policies223
and new laws224 that conflict with each other and are peripheral to, but
do not explicitly fix, the recognized problems with ECPA.225
days of the search happening. 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)(3). This statute permits limited exceptions
under which that notification period can be extended. Id. § 3103a(c).
219. DOJ Memo, supra note 66.
220. 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b); Andrew Crocker & Nate Cardozo, Here’s How We’re Fighting Back
Against “Secret” Search Warrants, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (July 5, 2017),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/07/eff-access-now-cdt-and-oti-fight-back-against-secret-searchwarrants [https://perma.cc/C7MR-HZMY].
221. Tom Krazit, As Congress Considers the Tech-Backed CLOUD Act, Privacy and Human
Rights Groups Raise Concerns, GEEKWIRE (Mar. 18, 2018, 12:00 PM), https://www.geekwire.com/
2018/congress-considers-tech-backed-cloud-act-privacy-human-rights-groups-raise-concerns/
[https://perma.cc/MNB3-U7V4].
222. Peter Diamandis, Why Tech Is Accelerating, HUFFPOST (Dec. 6, 2017),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/peter-diamandis/why-tech-is-accelerating_b_8951550.html
[https://perma.cc/9Y2J-NKAC] (referring to the exponential evolution of technology as the Law of
Accelerating Returns).
223. DOJ Memo, supra note 66.
224. Krazit, supra note 55.
225. Kerr, supra note 23, at 1214–16.
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Courts Are Ill-Equipped to Draw Arbitrary Lines Related to
Constitutional Provisions and Technology; the Legislature Must
Act

Courts’ inconsistent analysis and the differing outcomes applying
section 2705(b) show that the statute is practically unworkable and
inconsistently applied. The cases examined throughout this Comment226
show that judges making these rulings are hyper-aware of public opinion
and growing concerns over government surreptitiously accessing large
swaths of consumer data. Without action by the legislature, courts are
left without adequate tools to examine the constitutionality of ECPA in
relation to the acquisition of extensive consumer data stored in the
Cloud, and individuals are left with inconsistent search outcomes across
jurisdictions. Throughout the Supreme Court’s seminal cases on
technology and the Fourth Amendment, the majority ping-pongs
between failing to give technology special examination and recognizing
that technology demands a distinct analysis with stronger Fourth
Amendment protections.227 This inconsistent analysis shows a larger
fault in the Court’s ability to understand and aptly apply technological
differences.
While the majority in Riley based its decision on the Fourth
Amendment implications of advances in technology, Justice Alito was
not convinced the Court was the best entity to decipher the relationship
between advanced technology and the Fourth Amendment. In his
concurrence, Justice Alito said he would reevaluate the matter if
Congress created “reasonable distinctions” relating to privacy and
technology:228 “I would reconsider the question presented here if either
Congress or state legislatures . . . enact legislation . . . .”229 Most
recently, the government’s brief in the Carpenter case reflects a similar
sentiment:
If Congress and state legislatures share petitioner’s concern
about the type and quantity of information collected by cellservice providers and other third parties, those legislators can
pass laws to limit the collection, use, or dissemination of that
data. Rather than distort or arbitrarily limit Fourth Amendment
doctrine, “[i]n circumstances involving dramatic technological
226. Supra section I.B.; supra Part II.
227. Riley v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2487–89 (2014); cf. United States v. Jones,
565 U.S. 400, 412 (2012); supra notes 156 to 194 and accompanying text.
228. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2497 (Alito, J., concurring).
229. Id.
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change, the best solution to privacy concerns may be
legislative.”230
The legislature is well-equipped to create comprehensive reform.
First, the legislature can take input from concerned and affected parties
and adjust its laws accordingly.231 Second, it has the power to engage in
extensive debate and listen to more voices.232 The affected tech
companies may have more impact on the Senate floor than the court
room through lobbying efforts, particularly when the consumers have no
idea they are subject to searches.233 Third, it has the power to create laws
based on policy, not just interpret them.234 Taking into account diverse
opinions and considerations is vital to enacting a complex statutory
scheme, such as an ECPA update. This is something courts simply do
not have the tools, time, or resources to do. Therefore, the legislature
should govern the complex relationship between the Fourth Amendment
and technology. It should not leave the courts to decipher a thirty-yearold statute ill-equipped to provide adequate guidance to courts,
companies, and consumers.
This call to action has been echoed before. Academics,235 judges,236
lawyers237 have all recognized the legislature as the right branch of
government to reform ECPA and advocated it to do so. Indeed,
Professor Orin Kerr provides a comprehensive guide to amending the
statute.238 In Jones, Justice Alito established that congressional response
to courts issuing holdings about complicated areas of constitutional law
was not without precedent. After Katz, the legislature acted. The same
comprehensive legislative action must happen now. As written, ECPA’s
regulations do not adequately address societal expectations in 2018.

230. Brief for Respondent, supra note 62, at 31.
231. U.S. CONST. art. I.
232. Id.
233. Sarah Aitchison, Tech Execs Fear Continuing Government Surveillance, PUGET SOUND
BUS. J. (Oct. 9, 2014, 12:43 PM), http://www.bizjournals.com/seattle/blog/techflash/2014/10/techexecs-fear-continuing-government-surveillance.html [https://perma.cc/E8EQ-A5Y4].
234. U.S. CONST. art. I.
235. Kerr, supra note 23, at 1233.
236. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429–30 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
237. Brief for Respondent, supra note 62, at 40 (“Ultimately, if the quantity of information now
available in third-party business records raises novel privacy concerns, the proper body to address
them is the legislature.”).
238. Kerr, supra note 23, at 1233.
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The Court Should Treat Digital Data as Fundamentally Distinct
Rather than Drawing Attenuated Comparisons to Traditional
Surveillance Techniques

Courts throughout the country are left in a predicament. As recent
history has demonstrated, the judiciary is not the correct branch of
government to create detailed and comprehensive rules relating to
technology.239 The legislature has also not provided adequate guidance
for dealing with Cloud technology in the Fourth Amendment realm. As
Professor Orin Kerr wrote,
The SCA [ECPA] is not a catch-all statute designed to protect
the privacy of stored Internet communications; instead it is
narrowly tailored to provide a set of Fourth Amendment-like
protections for computer networks. Unfortunately, some judges
have had a difficult time realizing this, and have twisted the
statute to do things it was never intended to do.240
If Congress fails to act on ECPA,241 courts can still take some positive
action, despite the problems outlined above. One solution could be for
courts to explicitly acknowledge that technology deserves distinct
analysis under the Fourth Amendment.242
Courts should first recognize that digital Cloud data is fundamentally
different than any other type of data previously obtained by the
government.243 Following the trend established by the Sixth Circuit in
Warshak, and as opined in Riley, the fundamental difference between the
capacity of cell phones to store, search, aggregate, and analyze data, and
the capacity of an individual to write down a few names in an address
book illuminates the need for digital data to be analyzed differently.244
The Warshak opinion lays out the fundamental distinction well:
Since the advent of email, the telephone call and the letter have
waned in importance, and an explosion of Internet-based
239. Supra Part III.
240. Kerr, supra note 23, at 1214.
241. Devlin Barrett & Ellen Nakashima, Texas Gunman’s iPhone Could Reignite FBI-Apple
Feud over Encryption, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nation
al-security/texas-gunmans-iphone-could-reignite-fbi-apple-feud-over-encryption/2017/11/08/0c2b3
eb6-c48f-11e7-aae0-cb18a8c29c65_story.html?utm_term=.4206a64a887a [https://perma.cc/4NAHDPB9] (“While FBI Director Christopher A. Wray has warned that there are nearly 7,000 phones
that cannot be opened and said that such technologies are making it harder to fight terrorism and
crime, Congress has shown little interest in tackling the issue.”).
242. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429–30 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
243. See supra section I.A.
244. Riley v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2490–91 (2014).
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communication has taken place. People are now able to send
sensitive and intimate information, instantaneously, to friends,
family, and colleagues half a world away. Lovers exchange
sweet nothings, and businessmen swap ambitious plans, all with
the click of a mouse button. Commerce has also taken hold in
email. Online purchases are often documented in email
accounts, and email is frequently used to remind patients and
clients of imminent appointments. . . . Much hinges, therefore,
on whether the government is permitted to request that a
commercial ISP turn over the contents of a subscriber’s emails
without triggering the machinery of the Fourth Amendment.245
The use of the Cloud only increases that technological capacity and
strengthens the argument for digital data to be treated differently under
the Fourth Amendment.
Justice Alito has further alluded to this important distinction in his
push to treat data different when collected in the aggregate compared to
when collected as individual data points.246 As Justice Alito stated in his
Jones concurrence, “[f]or such offenses, society’s expectation has been
that law enforcement agents and others would not—and indeed, in the
main, simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue every single
movement of an individual’s car for a very long period.”247 The use of
technology should not usurp this expectation of privacy, and courts
should explicitly find Cloud data searches using advanced technology
are fundamentally distinct from the searches of the past.
Justice Alito’s sentiment, for example, directly relates to the use of
indefinite gag orders under ECPA. Although indefinite gag orders
cannot be directly compared to the issue in Jones because they require
some level of judicial scrutiny and, in each scenario, the government
acquired different kinds of information, the use of indefinite gag orders
to obtain a continuous and significant amount of consumer data is
exactly the type of concern Justice Alito addresses in his Jones
concurrence.248 Under Justice Alito’s reasoning,249 also echoed by
Justice Sotomayor,250 a limitation on the amount of data gathered
through indefinite gag orders would be required under the Fourth
Amendment. When the acquisition of nearly four weeks of individual
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 284 (6th Cir. 2010).
Jones, 565 U.S. at 429–30 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 430.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 418 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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location data is beyond the reasonable expectation for continuous
acquisition,251 nearly a year’s worth of the information from an
individual’s ISP must also be beyond the limit, particularly when it was
obtained without a warrant. Echoing concerns over the acquisition of
significant amount of customer data obtained through indefinite gag
orders and the desire to treat digital data differently, the Electronic
Frontier Foundation has noted, “[t]here are strong arguments that
Section 2705 nondisclosure orders are unconstitutional all or nearly all
of the time.”252 Recognizing that digital data is fundamentally distinct
from traditional forms of surveillance because of its unprecedented
acquisition and storage capacity is vital if courts are to create outcomes
consistent with the Fourth Amendment and across jurisdictions.
CONCLUSION
The tangled mess of ECPA and the Fourth Amendment provide
inadequate guidance to lower courts on the government’s ability to
collect and disseminate consumer information stored in the Cloud by
technology companies. Simply put, ECPA is antiquated when it comes
to modern technology.253 Neither the drafters of the Constitution nor the
authors of ECPA had any way to know that nearly every individual in
the United States would constantly carry a computer more powerful than
those that launched the Apollo rockets254 and then passively provide all
that information to third parties without any affirmative action on the
part of the consumer. Courts’ inconsistent application of ECPA’s
indefinite gag order provision show they are not well-equipped to
engage in technological analysis without up-to-date legislative tools.255
The Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence fails to address
the important technological and privacy issues that are becoming more
commonplace.256 Courts are left trying to cut through a Fourth
Amendment fog with only outdated statutes and inconsistent
jurisprudence to guide them. Comprehensive regulation of digital data
searches should be the legislature’s job.257 In the meantime, courts
251. Id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring).
252. Crocker & Cardozo, supra note 220.
253. A Summary of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), supra note 39.
254. David Grossman, How Do NASA’s Apollo Computers Stack Up to an iPhone?, POPULAR
MECHS. (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.popularmechanics.com/space/moon-mars/a25655/nasa-com
puter-iphone-comparison/ [https://perma.cc/BCJ2-LNVV].
255. Jones, 565 U.S. at 429–30 (Alito, J., concurring).
256. Id.
257. Id.
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should at least recognize the fundamental difference in scope between
collecting digital data and physical data—illustrated in Riley v.
California258 and United States v. Warshak259—when examining the
validity of government entities gathering private citizens’ data from
third-party private companies.

258. __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489–91 (2014).
259. 631 F.3d 266, 284–85 (6th Cir. 2010).

